Countering Corruption in Ukraine: Myths and Reality
Olena Babikova
Director of the Research Institute of Pre-Trial Investigation Problems,
Doctor of Law, Professor
The creation and launch of the NABU to detect, neutralize, and prevent corruption in the highest echelons of power, as well as the establishment of other anti-corruption bodies and reform of the law enforcement system, was one of the requirements of the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission, due to which on October 14, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law "On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine."
On April 16, 2015, the President of Ukraine issued two decrees: No. 217/2015 – on the establishment of NABU; to ensure transparency and civil control over its activities, Decree No. 272/2015 of May 15, 2015, also created the Public Control Council at the Bureau; on August 25, 2015, the first 70 detectives were selected; on November 30, 2015, the competition for the position of Head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office was completed; and on December 4 of the same year, NABU detectives entered the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations, thus beginning their activities.
Ten years of activity is enough time to draw certain conclusions and evaluate the activities of anti-corruption bodies. And the best way to give such an assessment is not based on agency reports but on the results of judicial review.
The court, as a more independent "arbiter," even under significant influence from "power agencies," provides more objective information for evaluating the activities of investigators and prosecutors, since it exercises judicial control over pre-trial investigations and substantive consideration of criminal proceedings.
Let us examine the Analysis of Judicial Proceedings by the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2025 (as a court of first instance), published on the official website of the HACC.
We will consider statistical data regarding judicial control over pre-trial investigations, primarily concerning interference with private life, violation of housing inviolability, wiretapping, seizure, and arrest of property.
In 2025, 10,098 petitions were submitted to the HACC investigative judges, which is 726 or 7.6% more than in the previous year, 2024.
Of these, 9% (887) were about imposing arrest on property, 18% (1,849) about permission to conduct searches, 20% (1,992) about permission for temporary access and seizure of property, 35% (3,574) about permission to conduct covert investigative actions. Thus, 82% of petitions concerned issues related to significant interference with human rights and freedoms. The court granted 87.7% of them.
To assess how the results of these investigative and procedural actions were used in the interests of criminal proceedings, it is necessary to find out how many persons were notified of suspicion following the investigations.
The report contains data on the number of petitions and the application of preventive measures, which almost equals the number of suspects and allows comparing the "activity" of detectives and prosecutors regarding the restriction of human rights and freedoms with the results of their work – establishing facts that may indicate the commission of a crime and the involvement of a certain person. After all, in the vast majority of cases, after notifying a person of suspicion, detectives apply for preventive measures.
During 2025, NABU detectives and SAP prosecutors initiated preventive measures against 207 persons (2% of the total number of petitions). Comparing the data on conducted measures, which involved significant restrictions of citizens' rights and freedoms, with the number of persons subjected to criminal prosecution, we can state that for each person notified of suspicion, there were almost 10 searches, as many seizures of property and documents, 4 property arrests, and over 15 permissions for covert investigative actions. Particular concern arises from the fact that a single ruling by an investigative judge usually grants permission for a whole complex of covert measures related to interference in private communication and life of a person.
Of course, such statistics do not mean that every person notified of suspicion directly experienced such interference in their private life, but they allow comparing the "efforts" of law enforcement and the results obtained. The conclusion is that restrictions on human rights and freedoms, interference in private life have become routine "tools," and covert investigative actions, despite being defined in criminal procedural law as exceptional, have become a standard means used unjustifiably widely, without any real judicial control restrictions.
The completeness of the picture of NABU's pre-trial investigation effectiveness is supplemented by statistical data on the results of HACC's consideration of criminal proceedings on the merits.
In 2025, HACC considered 441 criminal proceedings concerning 1,042 persons, of which only 105 cases (24%) concerned 119 persons (11%) who have a special status and to whom a special criminal procedure applies, as defined by Article 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
Considering that this category also includes local council deputies, lawyers, the above data should not be perceived as the number of proceedings against top officials.
Among the accused whose verdicts entered into legal force, only 43.5% worked in the public sector (members of parliament 3%, prosecutors 1.5%, judges 5.3%, civil servants and patronage service employees – 9%, military personnel 1.5%, heads and officials of state enterprises 18.7%, local council deputies 4.5%), while the vast majority of convicted persons were in the private sector – 56.5% (individual entrepreneurs 2.3%, employees of private law legal entities 20.3%; lawyers 6.8%, others 27.1%).
The data indicate that the results of NABU, SAP, and HACC's work did not achieve the declared goals of "detecting, neutralizing, and preventing corruption in the highest echelons of power to protect national security," for which they were created.
The vast majority of criminal proceedings did not concern corruption in the "highest echelons of power" at all but rather involved persons from the private sector, which directly contradicts NABU's tasks defined in part 2 of Article 1 of the relevant law.
The tendency to demonstrate their own effectiveness by investigating petty criminal proceedings that do not concern either the actions of officials in the highest echelons of power or corrupt acts that threaten national security is also observed in the statistical data on the results of HACC's judicial review of cases.
Most criminal offenses considered by HACC in 2025 are classified as serious and especially serious (429 cases concerning 1,013 persons or 97%). At the same time, 109 verdicts were issued: 104 convictions and 5 acquittals (154 persons convicted (85.6%), 8 persons acquitted (4.4%), 4 criminal proceedings concerning 16 persons were closed, and 1 indictment was returned to the prosecutor).
Of the 133 convicted persons whose verdicts entered into legal force: 25 (18.7%) were sentenced to imprisonment; 7 persons (5.2%) received the main punishment in the form of a fine; 97 (72.9%) were released from serving punishment with probation; 4 (3%) persons were released from punishment on other grounds.
Almost three-quarters of criminal proceedings ended with a verdict by which persons found guilty of corruption offenses were exempted from punishment.
However, this is not about the "leniency" of HACC in sentencing. On the contrary, the rapid increase in the number of verdicts based on plea agreements is related to the fact that the possibility of avoiding criminal punishment is linked not to proving a person's innocence but primarily to their ability to pay a substantial amount to funds designated by NABU and SAP employees and agreeing on this amount.
If in 2021 the share of verdicts approving plea agreements was 26%, in 2022 – 27%, in 2023 – 42%, in 2024 – 49%, then in 2025 – 66%. In the vast majority of these cases, punishments below the minimum threshold were applied, as a result of which, based on agreements, no convicted corrupt officials in 2025 received real imprisonment.
The plea agreement in criminal proceedings is an interesting but extremely dangerous tool. While it simplifies and speeds up judicial proceedings, compensates damages, and avoids overly harsh punishment, its uncontrolled use leads to the prosecution being uninterested in establishing the truth and objective circumstances. Instead, by applying extremely high bail amounts and ignoring defense arguments, a person is deprived of access to justice, facing a choice – admit guilt, pay damages and funds to a non-governmental organization, and receive a mild punishment, or prove innocence in court and be deprived, regardless of personal qualities and circumstances, of the right to deferred or other mild punishment. Multi-million bail amounts, intended to ensure proper behavior of the suspect, have turned into "hostage detention" and "funds arrest" to overcome the will and pursuit of justice.
Confirmation of this argument is found in verdicts in 43 HACC cases approving plea agreements, which are hidden from the public and access to their content is restricted. These are not insignificant cases but rather the most high-profile ones. Does hiding the conditions under which such agreements were reached meet the requirements of "transparency" and "publicity"?
Particular concern is also caused by the fact that, alongside fines ranging from 5,000 to 68,000 UAH paid to the state budget, mandatory requirements in agreements include directing funds to a fund designated by the prosecution side, a non-state entity whose activities, including the use of charitable contributions, are not controlled by the state. We are talking about hundreds of millions of hryvnias.
But is this approach to combating corruption exclusively the achievement of NABU, SAP, and HACC? Unfortunately, no. The entire anti-corruption system, due to reforms actively started in 2008, has undergone negative changes.
Let us analyze the register of corrupt officials, which contains information about all persons convicted of corruption offenses whose verdicts have entered into legal force. In 2025, information about 1,681 persons convicted of corruption offenses was included in the Register. Of these, 1,144 or 67.7% of the total number were persons convicted under part 1 of Article 369 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (offering, promising, or giving an unlawful benefit). This criminal offense is mostly committed not by state representatives or local self-government bodies but by ordinary citizens and entrepreneurs, against whom conditions are artificially created with restrictions on their rights and freedoms to provoke giving unlawful benefits, record such actions, and expose them.
Thus, the vast majority of detected corruption crimes should not be considered corruption at all, as they were committed not by officials or representatives of state power or local self-government.
The threat to society primarily comes from those who hold positions and use their official status for personal enrichment by obtaining unlawful benefits.
According to court statistics, the ratio of convicted persons for offering, promising, or giving unlawful benefits and those convicted for receiving such benefits by officials has changed significantly since 2008. If in 2008, for every 10 officials accused of receiving unlawful benefits, there was only one person accused of giving, by the end of 2025, the trend reversed completely: for each government representative suspected of receiving unlawful benefits, there are 16 persons accused of giving such benefits.
Thus, law enforcement agencies responsible for combating corruption focus their efforts not on overcoming real corruption in the public sector but mainly on creating the appearance of their "active" work without real results.
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