Risks of the Anti-Corruption Strategy: from Restricting Land Rights to Interference in the Judicial Branch

The adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 is a key international commitment of Ukraine within the Ukraine Facility and the EU accession negotiation process. The main draft bill No. 15230, prepared by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy, aims to minimize corruption in 16 priority areas — from defense to land relations. However, despite support from international partners, the document raised significant concerns due to inconsistencies with certain provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine and risks of violating the institutional balance in the state.

Issue of legal form: law or declaration?

The Main Scientific and Expert Department drew attention to the inconsistency between the bill's title and its content. The conclusion states that the document is essentially declarative and does not contain classic normative legal provisions.

The bill proposes to approve a Strategy that mainly consists of descriptions of problematic issues and expected results, rather than legal norms mandatory for implementation. This calls into question its compliance with the requirements for a law as a normative legal act.

Possible constitutional risks are also separately noted. According to Article 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine, laws must establish legal norms, whereas the document contains rather "strategic intentions," which may indicate a mismatch between the chosen legal form and its content.

Constitutional risks of foreigners' "decisive vote"

Involving international experts with decisive voting rights in the selection of members of the High Council of Justice, heads of the State Bureau of Investigations (DBR), and National Police is one of the most controversial provisions of the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030.

The Constitution clearly defines an exhaustive list of entities that form the composition of the High Council of Justice.

These include the Congress of Judges, the President, the Verkhovna Rada, the Congress of Advocates, the All-Ukrainian Prosecutors' Conference, and the Congress of Legal Universities' representatives.

International experts are not included in this list. Granting them decisive voting rights effectively changes the constitutionally established procedure for forming the judicial governance body.

Since foreigners are not subjects of forming government bodies according to the Basic Law, introducing such a mechanism requires amendments to the Constitution, which cannot be made during martial law according to Article 157.

According to Articles 1 and 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine, Ukraine is a sovereign state, and the only source of power is the people, who exercise it directly or through state authorities.

Independence of power implies the absence of political or organizational dependence on anyone outside the state.

The Main Scientific and Expert Department notes that granting foreigners the right to decisive influence over the staffing of key institutions (courts, police, SBI) may be considered a restriction of state sovereignty.

Cooperation with international organizations should be carried out through obtaining recommendations, not through mandatory participation in forming government bodies with veto or decisive voting rights.

The risks of this mechanism are confirmed by the fact that the issue of foreigners' participation in selection commissions is already subject to active judicial review.

Currently, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is considering a submission by 56 people's deputies requesting to declare similar provisions in current laws (on the High Council of Justice, High Qualification Commission of Judges, NABU, SACPO, SBI, etc.) unconstitutional.

If the Strategy is adopted in its current form, it risks being declared unconstitutional, which would jeopardize the stability of the entire anti-corruption and judicial system.

Interference in the judicial branch

The proposal set out in the main draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 (No. 15230) to grant the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) exclusive competence to interpret conflicts of interest in judges is one of the most criticized norms from the standpoint of constitutional law and judicial independence.

According to Article 6 of the Constitution of Ukraine, state power is exercised on the principles of its division into legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

NACP is a central body of the executive branch with a special status.

Granting an executive authority the right to establish rules of conduct for judges during the administration of justice and interpret the limits of their procedural behavior is direct interference in the judicial branch. The Main Scientific and Expert Department emphasizes that this violates guarantees of judicial independence, as the judicial function must be exercised solely on the basis of law and facts, without external influence.

Moreover, current legislation, including the Law "On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges," assigns the function of protecting professional interests and resolving internal court matters to bodies of judicial self-government.

Currently, the Council of Judges develops and organizes measures to ensure judicial independence, including providing clarifications on conflicts of interest and the application of anti-corruption legislation to judges.

The Strategy proposes to exclude the powers of the Council of Judges regarding control over the resolution of conflicts of interest in judges. The attempt by NACP to replace the self-government body creates a risk of turning executive clarifications into a tool of pressure on judges.

Experts draw attention to the UN Convention against Corruption (Article 11), which emphasizes that measures to strengthen judicial integrity must be taken without prejudice to the independence of judicial bodies.

According to the Bangalore Principles, a judge must be independent from any external influence, inducement, or pressure. Transferring the right to interpret a judge's procedural integrity to a body belonging to another branch of power directly contradicts these international principles.

Procedural codes (The Criminal Procedural Code, The Civil Procedural Code, Commercial Procedural Code) already contain special mechanisms for resolving conflicts of interest through the institutions of challenge and self-recusal.

Advisory body under NACP

Special attention in the comments is given to the provisions of the Anti-Corruption Strategy that provide for the creation of a Coordination Working Group as an advisory body under NACP. It is noted that these provisions, as well as the current wording of Article 182 of the Law of Ukraine "On Prevention of Corruption," do not fully comply with the provisions of Articles 6 and 19 of the Constitution of Ukraine and the relevant practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

According to Articles 6 and 19 of the Constitution of Ukraine, state authorities are obliged to act exclusively on the basis, within the powers, and in the manner defined by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. At the same time, the powers of the Verkhovna Rada are established exclusively by the Constitution (part 2 of Article 85 of the Basic Law), as repeatedly confirmed by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in its decisions.

In this context, it is also emphasized the legal position of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, according to which the Verkhovna Rada cannot go beyond constitutionally defined powers, including by enshrining provisions in acts that effectively expand the competence of the parliament or other state bodies (in particular, the Constitutional Court Decision of 13.06.2019 No. 5-r/2019).

Based on this, the creation of an advisory body under a central executive authority is considered a matter that does not belong to the direct competence of the Verkhovna Rada. Accordingly, doubts arise about the constitutional justification of the norm establishing a mandatory requirement to create such a body at the legislative level.

Risks of reforming financial control and administration

Expert comments concern provisions of the Strategy that provide for automatic dismissal of officials in case of a court decision on exemption from criminal liability for corruption offenses (including on non-rehabilitative grounds).

Such an approach may contradict the presumption of innocence principle enshrined in Article 62 of the Constitution of Ukraine, as well as the standards of the European Court of Human Rights regarding guarantees of a fair trial and individualization of responsibility.

Separately, there is a risk of nullifying incentive norms of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (in particular part 5 of Article 354), which provide for exemption from criminal liability for persons who assist in exposing corruption offenses. In case of automatic application of disciplinary dismissal, such an incentive model may lose effectiveness.

The proposal to grant NACP the right to appeal court decisions made based on protocols drawn up by its authorized persons is criticized.

It is noted that such a construction may violate the principles of administrative procedure, since the body that records the offense is not an independent party to the dispute with an autonomous procedural interest. Expanding its procedural role to the level of appellant potentially creates an imbalance in the judicial process and may affect guarantees of a fair trial.

Institutional independence of SACPO and risks of changing the prosecution model

The draft Anti-Corruption Strategy identifies the insufficient level of independence and institutional resilience of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SACPO) as a problem, which, according to the authors, reduces its effectiveness.

To address this, it proposes expanding the powers of the head of SAP, including regarding entering information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations concerning people's deputies, agreeing procedural motions, sending extradition requests, creating joint investigative teams in NABU proceedings, extending investigation terms, and conducting procedural actions without the participation of the Prosecutor General. Strengthening internal autonomy of SAP's personnel policy is also envisaged.

These proposals are controversial given the principle of unity of the prosecution system enshrined in the Constitution and law. They effectively expand SACPO's autonomy, bringing it closer to a separate institution, raising questions about the role of the Prosecutor General as head of the unified prosecution system.

The changes may weaken the unity principle of the prosecution and reduce the personal responsibility of the Prosecutor General, who formally remains the head of the system but whose powers are substantially limited in key categories of cases.

Instead, institutional independence of SAP should be strengthened not by separation, but by improving competitive procedures, procedural guarantees, judicial control, and mechanisms of personal responsibility of prosecutors within the current model.

Land sector: constitutional trap of "abolishing privatization"

The draft Strategy proposes a radical reform of the institution of free land privatization.

Subdivision 2.13 of the draft provides for introducing a norm on abolishing the institution of free privatization of land plots. An exception is proposed only for plots with existing private buildings or those transferred for use before 2002.

Such an initiative directly contradicts part 3 of Article 22 of the Basic Law, which prohibits narrowing the content and scope of existing rights when adopting new laws. The right to own land is guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution, and the current Land Code provides citizens the right to free acquisition of plots regardless of the year they were granted for use.

Establishing a restriction by the term "before 2002" is recognized as unfounded, since the right to privatize plots in use is permanent and cannot be abolished in this way. Moreover, the Main Scientific and Expert Department points to the risk that preserving the right of use (result 2.13.2.1) also violates the Constitution, since the law requires preservation of existing rights, not their forced transformation.

Financial risks: ignoring the Verkhovna Rada Regulations

Implementing such a large-scale document as the Anti-Corruption Strategy requires a clear understanding of the reform costs for taxpayers, but this aspect is practically absent in draft No. 15230.

According to Article 91 of the Verkhovna Rada Regulations, if a bill leads to changes in budget indicators, the initiator must add a financial and economic justification with appropriate calculations. The explanatory note to draft No. 15230 states that funding will come from state and local budgets, as well as international aid.

The authors propose that calculations be made by NACP later — only during the preparation of the State Anti-Corruption Program (SACP). However, the Main Scientific and Expert Department emphasizes that since the Strategy itself defines measures objectively requiring expenditures now, the absence of calculations at the law consideration stage is a direct violation of legislative requirements.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy 2026–2030 is a critically important document for European integration and national security, but its current version contains a number of significant legal risks that need to be addressed before final adoption. The main areas for revision should be: bringing provisions on foreigners' "decisive vote" into compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine, preserving the subjectivity of the Council of Judges of Ukraine in matters of judicial ethics and conflicts of interest, excluding norms that may narrow citizens' constitutional land rights, and ensuring proper financial support for the implementation of the envisaged measures.

Only by taking these comments into account can the Strategy become not a declarative document but an effective tool for forming honest state policy and advancing European integration.

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