Providing the FSB with coordinates of the locations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine constitutes a completed act of treason regardless of subsequent damage to the objects — Supreme Court

The issue of liability for state treason under martial law remains relevant, and judicial practice regarding the application of Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine continues to develop.

On July 16, 2026, the Third Judicial Panel of the Cassation Criminal Court within the Supreme Court considered case No. 334/10515/24 concerning the conviction of a Ukrainian citizen under Part 2 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine for providing an FSB officer of the Russian Federation with information about the deployment and movement of units and military equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

One of the key issues in the case was whether it is necessary to establish a causal link between the transmission of information and specific harm to Ukraine’s national security to qualify such actions as state treason. The Supreme Court also expressed its position on the admissibility of information from open internet sources as evidence and the establishment of the individual’s intent to assist the aggressor state.

Circumstances of the case

The court of first instance found that from March 22 to June 8, 2024, the accused, acting intentionally under martial law, voluntarily agreed to assist an FSB officer of the Russian Federation in conducting subversive activities against Ukraine.

Through a Telegram account, he transmitted information about the location of Ukrainian military equipment in hangars and other buildings, the movement of military equipment through the city of Zaporizhzhia towards Orikhiv, as well as the whereabouts of servicemen and equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at several sites in Zaporizhzhia and the region.

The military command confirmed that on the specified dates, units and military equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other Defense Forces, including air defense systems, were actually deployed at the indicated locations. This information was not publicly available and was not subject to free dissemination.

The Dnipro District Court of Zaporizhzhia found the man guilty under Part 2 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment with confiscation of all his property. The Zaporizhzhia Court of Appeal upheld the verdict.

In the cassation appeal, the defense argued, among other things, that the accused’s intent to assist a foreign state in subversive activities was not properly established, nor was there a causal link between his actions and harm to Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, defense capability, or national security.

The defense also questioned the use of information from internet sites and Telegram and insisted that the accused’s statements were merely personal oppositional opinions.

Position of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court indicated that electronic (digital) evidence, including photographic, audio, video materials, and other information carriers, including computer data contained in open or closed networks that record factual data about unlawful acts of individuals or groups, collected by operational units in compliance with procedural law, are primary evidence in criminal proceedings concerning crimes against the foundations of Ukraine’s national security.

The court noted that the mere fact of obtaining information from open internet sources does not indicate the inadmissibility of such evidence. Information posted openly on official information resources may be used as documents under Article 99 of the Criminal Procedure Code, provided they are properly procedurally recorded.

In this case, the relevant information was recorded by protocols of resource review and examined by courts in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court found no grounds to declare the factual data from these protocols inadmissible or improper evidence.

At the same time, electronic evidence from open sources was not the sole basis for concluding the identity of the person with whom the accused communicated as an agent of the aggressor state’s intelligence services. They were used in conjunction with a surveillance protocol on Telegram correspondence and other data. Thus, information from open sources was applied as part of a system of electronic evidence, not as isolated proof.

Regarding the nature of the correspondence, the Supreme Court noted that the accused not only engaged in politically charged communication but also systematically transmitted photographs, videos, maps with coordinates, described the movement of military equipment, probable locations of Armed Forces units, and provided specific references to particular objects.

The court pointed out that the nature and content of his messages, including specific coordinates, references to objects, remarks about the need to "clean" his smartphone, fears of phone checks, and the desire to delete videos and communication channels, indicate purposeful collection and transmission of information, awareness of its value to Russian intelligence, and the desire to conceal his actions from possible detection — indicating awareness of the illegality of his actions.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the subject of the crime under Article 111 of the Criminal Code, when a person acts to the detriment of Ukraine’s national security foundations, includes any information collected for transmission or transmitted in fulfillment of a foreign state’s or its representative’s task, including publicly available information that is of interest to the adversary, especially information not publicly disclosed about the movement of military equipment, probable locations of Armed Forces units, weapons, technical means, and others that ensure Ukraine’s defense capability and security, its ability to repel aggression.

The accused’s argument that his actions were merely an expression of oppositional political views was also rejected by the court.

The Supreme Court noted that the political assessments contained in the accused’s messages were accompanied by concrete information about the deployment of Ukrainian troops, routes of equipment movement, possible locations of headquarters, and fortified objects, which clearly goes beyond mere expression of opinions and constitutes real assistance to a foreign intelligence service in subversive activities against Ukraine.

By sending specific information of operational interest to the adversary amid armed aggression against Ukraine, the accused could not but realize that this information was important and of interest specifically to the enemy.

Therefore, the court agreed with the conclusions of the lower courts that the accused could not have failed to understand that the information he repeatedly transmitted would be used by representatives of the state conducting armed aggression against Ukraine.

Separately, the Supreme Court addressed the establishment of intent.

The court stated that guilt as a mandatory element of the subjective side of any crime is inseparably linked to its objective features; its content reflects the objective features of the crime, so there is no abstract guilt detached from a specific socially dangerous act.

The question of intent during qualification is resolved based on the totality of all circumstances of the act. The features of the subjective side and the peculiarities of the accused’s mental attitude toward the committed acts and their consequences are established according to the nature of the act and the objective-subjective conditions of its commission, based on factual circumstances established by the court and supported by proper and admissible evidence.

At the same time, the Supreme Court rejected the defense’s argument about the necessity to establish a causal link between the transmission of information and specific harm to Ukraine.

The court indicated that the crime under Part 2 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code belongs to offenses with a formal composition, the objective side of which is exhausted by the socially dangerous act defined by law.

The legislative construction of this crime does not require establishing causation, since the mere fact of intentional commission by a Ukrainian citizen under martial law of an act harmful to sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, defense capability, state, economic or informational security of Ukraine in the form of providing assistance to a foreign state, foreign organization, or their representatives in conducting subversive activities against Ukraine is sufficient for qualification under Part 2 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code.

As the court noted, the mere fact of voluntarily providing coordinates of Ukrainian troop locations to a career FSB officer of the Russian Federation amid active hostilities indicates the act’s direction to harm the state and constitutes a completed act of state treason regardless of whether specific acts of damage to these objects were subsequently committed.

At the same time, damage to the relevant objects could influence sentencing and other criminal-legal consequences, but in this case, such specific consequences were not discussed.

Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s verdict and the appellate court’s ruling, and dismissed the defense’s cassation appeal.

Therefore, to qualify under Part 2 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code, it is not necessary to prove that the transmission of coordinates of military objects led to their actual damage or other specific consequences. The mere intentional commission of such an act under the conditions established by law is sufficient for a completed crime.

"Sudovo-Yurydychna Hazeta" also analyzed two recent European Court of Human Rights decisions dated July 23, 2026, with differing conclusions regarding the detention of accused persons in crimes against national security. In the case of Kolesnyk and Smelnytskyy v. Ukraine, the ECHR upheld the detention of persons accused of treason for transmitting video footage of Ukrainian Armed Forces fortifications to Russia, whereas in the case of Derevyanko and Tarasova v. Ukraine, it found a violation of the Convention, emphasizing the need for proper justification of detention even under martial law.

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